<p>Montgomery's task now was to drive toward the Zuider Zee, crossing the Rhine and outflanking the Siegfried Line defenses. In support, he was assigned a huge airborne operation: Market, which would land about half the combined strengths of the British 1st and the American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions.
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<p>Market was preceded by heavy air strikes against German flak defense by Eighth AF and RAF heavies. On the morning of 17 September, 1,546 troop-carrying aircraft and 478 gliders took off. Losses in their drop and landing zones were minimal, and the Luftwaffe was hardly in evidence. A day later, a second aerial fleet dropped and landed reinforcements from 1,306 aircraft and 1,152 gliders.
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<p>The British drop zone was in front of two strong German panzer divisions, and Garden—Montgomery's ground operation—became a disaster. The Germans were not yet beaten on the ground, and Market/Garden did nothing to speed the defeat.
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<p>Maintaining a flow of supplies remained a problem. The ground armies had halted against the Siegfried Line because they were low on supplies. Eisenhower made the point that an additional deep-water port to the north was "... an indispensable prerequisite for the final drive into Germany." Antwerp was the logical choice, and the ground campaign to reduce its defenders and capture it was supported all the way by tactical air strikes. So were subsequent drives against Aachen and other German towns on the invasion route to the Ruhr.
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<p>It was desperate, heavy ground fighting all the way. The Germans had brought up every possible reinforcement. They dug in and held, taking terrible losses, but not giving much territory in exchange. Air power was doing all it could as 1944 ground toward its end. The Allies had air superiority over the battlefield, and held it. The Luftwaffe was rarely seen, and German soldiers grew increasingly bitter as they wondered where their air support was hiding.
